Geneva Otero and the State of Utah, By and Through Utah State Department of Social Service v. Joe Williams :  Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Geneva Otero and the State of Utah, By and
Through Utah State Department of Social Service v.
Joe Williams : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN, DIANE W. WILKINS; Attorneys for Respondents;BRIAN M.
BARNARD, MARY C. CORPORON; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Williams, No. 16819 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2037
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVA OTERO and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through Utah 
State Department of Social 
Services, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
-vs-
JOE WILLIAMS, 
Defendant - Appellant 
Case No. 16819 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Judge G. Hal Taylor, 
Presiding 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Third Year Law Student for 
Appellant 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
150 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney~ for Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVA OTERO and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through Utah 
State Department of Social 
Services, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
-vs-
JOE WILLIAMS, 
Defendant - Appellant 
Case No .. 16819 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Judge G. Hal Taylor, 
Presiding 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Third Year Law Student for 
Appellant 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
150 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys. for Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE • 
DISPOSITION INTHE LOWER COURT • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL • • . . . . . . 
. . . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .• . . . . . . . . . . 
ARGUMENT. 
POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE 
HIS DISCRETION BY HOLDING THAT THE STATE 
OF UTAH SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR ITS EXPEN-»>:.-·. 







EVEN IN LIGHT OF HIS FINANCIAL POSITION . 4~8 
POINT II: THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED TO AVOID HIS SUPPORT DUTY THROUGH 
HIS MISDEEDS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8-9 
POINT III: THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF THIS ACTION WAS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF 
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE, BUT WAS RELE-
VANT ONLY TO THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT AR-
REARAGES • • · • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • 10-11 
POINT IV: THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE FATHER TO 
BEAR THE FULL COST OF REIMBURSEMENT TO 
THE STATE OF UTAH. • • • • • • • • • • • •• 11-15 
POINT V: THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IS JUSiT AND REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED • 15-18 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . • • 18-19 
CASES.CITED 
DAY V. BROOKS, 224 N.E. 2d 561, 10 Ohio Misc. 273 • • 12 
FORBUSH v. FORBUSH, 578 P.2d 518 (Utah, 1978) 
GULLEY v. GULLEY, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah, 1977) • 
HARMON v. HARMON, 491 P.2d 231 (Utah, 1971) 
. . . . • • 13' 14 
. . . . . • s,:10 
• • • 14 
HARRIS v. HARRIS, 585 P. 2d 435 (Utah, 1978) • • • • • 5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HOLMES vs. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, 359 
A.2d 90, 278 Md. 60. • • . • • . . • • . 12 
IN RE ADOPTION OF DOBBS, 531 P.2d 303 (Wash. App., 1975 . 12,16,17 
IN RE McAHREN's ADOPTION, 331 A.2d 419 (Md, 1975} . 12 
McGOWEN v. STATE, 566 S.W. 2d 1958 • 12 
REEVES v. REEVES, 556 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1976} 6 
RIDING v. RIDING, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329 P.2d 878 (1958} •.. 5 
STATE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES v. CLARK, 554 P.2d 
1310 (Utah, 1976} ..• 5,9,14,16 
STATUTES CITED 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-3·.- . . 5 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-7. . . . . . . 10,17 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-7 (2) 11 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-7(3} . . . . . 11 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45a-1 . . . . . . . 1,2,5 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45b-1.1 . . 5 
'•, 
"' OTHER SOURCES CITED 
59 AM JUR. 2d, Parent and Child, §55 . . . 
·~,. 
. . . . • 5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------
GENEVA OTERO and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 






CASE NO. 16819 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT, OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action sought a determination of paternity, a 
judgment for past support paid for the minor child of the 
parties, and an order for future support of the child pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-45a-l et. seq. 
(1953 as amended) . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER :coURT 
The defendant stipulated that he is the father of the 
child in question and allowed the court to enter an order to 
that effect. After this stipulation, a hearing was held on 
November 14, 1979 to determine the arrearages due and owing 
-1-
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the State of Utah for its support of the child through the 
welfare program and also to determine the ability of the 
defendant to repay said arrearage. Evidence was presented, 
stipulations as to Welfare amounts agreed to, and argument 
permitted by counsel. 
A judgment was granted by the trial court and against 
the defendant in the sum of $4,179.67 for support previously 
provided by the plaintiff, Division of Social Services, with 
execution upon the judgment being.stayed until the defendant is 
placed on a work release program or is released from prison, 
at which time defendant's financial ability shall be reviewed. 
It is this judgment that is being appealed by the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek that the judgment of the court below 
be affirmed. Plaintiffs also request that the court hold, 
as a matter of law, that a parent is not released from his 
obligation to reimburse the State for support given the 
minor child, simply due to the fact he is incarcerated at the 
State Prison. 
ST.ATEMENT OF FACTS 
An action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County for the purpose of determining 
paternity, obtaining reimbursement of monies already expended 
by the State of Utah for the support of the child, and a 
continuing order for future support pursuant to u.c.A. 
§78-45a-l et.seq. (1953 as amended). 
The child, Elisha Miera, was born out of wedlock to 
·"· 
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co-plaintiff, Geneva Otero, on March 30, 1978. The defendant 
stipulated that he is the father of the child after commencement 
of the action. Defendant was, and has been at all times since 
the birth of the child, incarcerated in either the Salt Lake 
County Jail or the Utah State Prison at Draper, Utah. 
Defendant, agreed that a hearing beheld on November 14, 1979 
to determine defendant's obligation for support and arrearages, 
if any. Prior to the hearing, the child was killed in an auto-
pedestrian accident, and the hearing on November 14, 1979 dealt 
only with the subject of past support. 
At the hearing on November 14, 1979 both plaintiffs and 
defendant were represented by counsel. This hearing was not 
a summary judgment hearing, but an evidentiary hearing to 
determine arrearages. Defendant did not appear but presented 
affidavits which stated his income, the value of his possessions, 
and the fact that his earning potential is greatly impaired by 
his imprisonment at the State Penitentiary. The parties 
stipulated in open court to the amount of support furnised by 
the State Division of Social Services. The Court, per Judge G. 
Hal Taylor, heard oral arguments by counsel and ordered the 
defendant to reimburse the State for the support and medical 
expenses rendered the child in the amount of $4,179.67. 
In anorder dated December 3, 1979, the court below gave 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
$4,179.67 in support arrearages paid by the State of Utah for 
the support of the child from her birth in March, 1978 to her 
death in September, 1979. The $4,179.67 consisted of $918.67 
expended for medical expenses related to the birth of the child Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and $3,261.00 expended as support of the child from March, 1978 
through September, 1979. The Court took into account the indigenc1 
of the defendant as represented by the affidavits. The Court 
below also issued a. stay of execution on the judgment until such time 
as the defendant is released from prison or is on a work 




THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
BY HOLDING THAT THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD BE 
REIMBURSED FOR ITS EXPENDITURES ON THE DEFEN-
DENT' S CHILD'S BEHALF EVEN IN LIGHT OF HIS 
FINANCIAL POSITION. 
Appellant is apparently confusing the real issues 
before this court. The main issue appears to be an attack on 
whether a father has an obligation to reimburse the State 
of Utah under varying economic conditions rather than whether 
the arrearages were calculated under the appropriate statute. 
A~pellant is really arguing an "all or nothing" position, or 
in other words he should either pay "all or nothing" of the care 
of the child when the State of Utah is involved. Appellant 
attempts to hide the impact of his position by failing to 
analyze what if any effect there is on the custodial mother 
:;:: 
if and.when she is not on Public Assistance. Respondent believes ~~ 
that to fail to raise the entire scope of his position, appella~~ 
is failing to adequately present the issues to the court. 
-4-
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The duty of the appellant to support his child came into 
existence at birth. This is specifically established by Utah 
Code Annotated 78-45-3, and Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l 
holds him "liable to the same extent as the father of a child 
born in wedlock." This duty means that the defendant was 
obligated to provide his child with the necessities of life 
until emancipation, or until the child was adopted. 59 AM 
Jur. 2d Parent and Child §55 (1971); Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 
136, 329 P. 2d 878 (1958); Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 
{Utah 1978). However, defendant made no attempt to meet his 
duty and his child was left in need. Thus, the State rescued 
defendant's needy child and provided the child with the 
necessities of life. 
Utah case law allows a 'parent" to be sued when a third 
party furnishes the parent's child with necessities. State 
Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 {Utah 1976); and 
in Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah, 1977)., the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the following: 
"Whether by the statute hereinabove referred to, or 
by the common law, the just and logical consequence of the 
duty of parents to support their children is that if 
they are left in need and a third party provides them 
necessities, he is subrogated to the child's right 
and may obtain reimbursement therefor." 
In the present aase, the State brought this action after 
it had paid for the necessities of defendant's child. This 
action was not initiated to enforce an unreasonable or arbitrary 
duty but was brought so that the defendant would be responsible 
for his actions and financially to the extent found by the court. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-4Sb-l.l, the State found 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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maintainedby the defendant's resources-to the extent found by 
the court to be appropriate-instead of the funds furnished by 
the general citizenry through the welfare program. More 
particularly, this obligation is found discussed and delineated 
in Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267 (1976) as follows: 
"The children are undonditionally entitled to support 
from their parents; and the State is authorized by 
law and should be encouraged and aided as a matter of 
public policy to see that the responsibility is borne by 
them, both initially and in any necessary subsequent 
proceedings." 
Appellant would have this court believe that because he 
(1) has little money, (2) is incarcerated, (3) does not have 
custody, (4) will not have custody when he is released, and (5) 
has not provided any kind of love, affection, care, etc., that he 
simply may acknowledge that he is the father of a child and then 
turn around and walk away from any and all responsibility as long 
as the above remain in whole or in part. Such is beyond reason, 
and slaps the intent of the law and basic moral responsibility tha1::1 
each parent has. As will be discussed in further arguments, there~ 
more to child ••rearing" than financial support. Appellant tries ~ 
to make financial support the only basis for this court or any 
court to use in determining the liability of both parties. This :~ 
is not sound, and cannot be the only criteria used. Appellant :t 
has failed to show where the lower court abused any discretion ast~i 
this determination. Without such a showing, the appellant has no :~ 
complaint worthy of consideration. 
The record is clear that the trial Judge reviewed the 
condition of the appellant. Affidavits and argument adequately 
presented the facts relevant to the financial condition of the 
appellant. The court, however, . . ~ .- :, -~~wstances' \ 
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in this case, the temporary incarceration could not be used as a 
justifiable excuse to cancel his lawful duty to support the child. 
After such a review, the trial court ordered that the defendant 
would need to satisfy the judgment when he is released from jail 
or able to do so. 
Respondent is sure that most involved in prosecuting or 
defending this appeal have had expenses arise such as Doctor bills, 
hospital bills, etc., where at the time they have occured, the funds 
are not avai£ble to repay. That, however does not change the fact 
that services were rendered and somewhere, sometime the money 
will have to be repaid. Such is the case here. Naturally, the 
State of Utah or any other body-even the court-cannot guarantee 
that the defendant will ever be in a comfortable financial 
position, but that cannot be the sole basis to determine whether 
a judgment be taken to establish the firm duty or not. If the 
duty is found, the State of Utah is entitled to a judgment for the 
amount found to reasonably and necessarily have been provided. 
Whether that amount is ever collected (i.e.: bad debts, etc.) 
is not a matter before this court. The trial judge found it 
appropriate to stay collection on the judgment until the 
temporary incarceration terminates, or upon further review of 
the court. This meant that the defendant would not have to pay the 
judgment until he is placed on a work release program or until he 
is released from prison and working on the outside. 
The judgment against the defendant is a sum certain 
which can be satisfied over a period of time. The payment of 
the judgment will allow the defendant to fulfill his support 
duty and be responsible for his child. Any other outcome Spo sored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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from this action will set a precedent for a father to avoid his 
support obligation, and will undermine the very foundation of the1 
parent-child relationship. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO AVOID 
HIS SUPPORT DUTY THROUGH HIS MISDEEDS. 
Defendant bas~s most of his argument on the reasoning 
that he should be judicially relieved from meeting his support 
obligation due to his poor financial position and incarcera-
tion in prison. However, defendant fails to mention that this 
"indigency" is a result of his own misdeeds. If defendant is 
allowed to avoid his support duty because of his prison confine-
ment then in actuality defendant is benefiting financially 
from his wrong doings. 
Because of the fact there is no ongoing support to be 
ordered, this case is different than others that might arise. 
Here, we have a sum certain which the court has found that the 
defendant owes. Part of a prisoners rehabilitiation is 
accepting the responsibility of his actions. If defendant is 
allowed to ~hirk his responsibility for supporting his child 
through court approval, then this process is thwarted and little 
if any good results to anyone. Thus, defendant's duty to his 
child should not be abrogated merely because he committed a 
wrong, placing him in prison and making him unable to pay large 
'•, 
\ 
amounts. But instead, defendant's duty should be postponed until ": 
he is financially able to meet his responsibility and satisfy the ': 
r.' judgment. \ 
On the other hand, if there was ongoing support to be 
:~ 
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paid, the one with the duty could request the court through 
appropriate hearings, to deteI:1Inine the amount to pay while he is 
in Prison. Even those in such circumstances have a responsibility 
to pay a portion of the~r earnings for child support. To rule 
otherwise is to say that by ones own choice of "wrong-doing," 
one can be relieved of that responsibility. This court said in StatE 
Division of Family Services v_. Clark, supra: 
" ••• inasmuch as the father cannot do so (avoid 
duty of support) by voluntary attempts, there 
certainly should be no reason why he should be 
relieved of that oblrgation by n~s misdeeds. Even 
if his misconduct mav have worked a forfeiture of 
his right to custody: he should not gain any 
advantage from his own wrong nor should it 
adversely affect the right of the child to support." [Emphasis added] 
The lower court's order that the defendant satisfy the 
judgment when he is able to do so, will only give the defendant an 
advantage from his wrong doing to the extent that his duty 
to pay the judgment will be postponed until he is no longer 
indigent. This decision will not be that great of a hardship 
to the defendant but could be very beneficial to him in the 
long run bec~use he will begin to accept responsibility for his 
actions and he will begin to understand the importance of a parent's 
duty with respect to his child. Thus, the trial judge did not 
err when he considered all the facts surrounding this case and held 
that the defendant should reimburse the State when he is able 
to do so for the expenses paid for his child. The fact that 
one is incarcerated in the County Jail or the Prison is not grounds 
to remove the duty of support from a parent. To rule otherwise 
would invite individuals to voluntary indigency (i.e.: quit work, 
etc.) for the purpose of avoiding the duty to support during times 
of J ;.,_...,, ...... ---~-:"-~.!.----- ~ ~::~h an argument must be rejected. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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POINT III 
THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION WAS NOT 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE, BUT WAS 
RELEVANT ONLY TO THE A.~OUNT OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES. 
As was shown in Point I of this argument, defendant had 
a duty to support his child. This duty made the defendant liable 
for any necessities which a third party expended on behalf of 
his child. (See Gulley v. Gulley). Therefore, the time when 
this action was commenced had no effect on the outcome of this 
case because it was not relevant to whether the defendant had a 
support duty. The timing of this action was only germane to the 
amount of money the State expended for defendant's child. 
This issue concerning the amount of necessary money spent on 
defendant's child was clearly substantiated by the State at 
the trial level. 
When this action came before Judge Taylor, the judge was 
aware of defendant's lack of income and was also aware of the faC' 
that defendant had made no attempt to support his child. As a 
result, the judge could have based his decision solely on the 
decisions of this court which entitles a third-party to reimburse 
ment from a parent for expenses on his child's behalf. The 
application of Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7, as referred to by 
appellant reaches the same result. To claim the court erred 
by not applying the appropriate section is misleading and 
essentially begs the question. However, even if defendant's 
contention were correct, the trial judge still made the proper 
decision. 
When this case came before Judge Taylor, defendant's 
child was deceased. Therefore, orosoective support on the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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child's behalf was not an issue. Section 78-45-7(2) of the 
Utah Code Annotated concerns only prospective support. on the 
other hand, Section 78-45-7(3) of the U.C.A. is limited to 
back support. This section states: 
"(3) When no prior court order exists, the court 
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon, 
but not limited to: 
a) The amount of public assistance received by the 
obligee, if any: 
b) ··Ihe funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of spouse and 
children." (Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(3).) 
By applying the above criteria, the trial court's 
decision was a sound one. All pertinent information was 
reviewed and considered. As a result the court awarded the 
State reimbursement for the public assistance it expended for 
defendant's child. In reaching his decision the trial judge 
did not overlook the earning capacity of the defendant, because 
he realized that the judgment was a sum certain that could be 
satisfied over a period of time. Thus, Judge Taylor did not 
abuse his discretion in requiring the defendant to pay the 
judgment when he is able to do so. The financial condition of 
the appellant at the time this matter was instituted or heard 
was not dispositive of the matter as argued by appellant, and 
this position should be rejected. 
POINT JV 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISGRESSION IN ORDERING 
THE FATHER TO BEAR THE FULL COST OF REIMBURSEMENT 
TO THE STATE OF UTAH. 
All children have a right to be supported and nutured 
by their parents. The duties of a parent are set out in the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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case of In Re Adoption of Dobbs 531 P. 2d 303 (Wash. App, 1975): 
"The general obligations of parenthood include 
these minimum standards: 1) Express love and 
affection for the child. 2) Express personal concern 
over the health, education, and general well being • 
of the child. 3) The duty to supply the necessary food, 
clothing, and medical care. 4) The duty to provide an ~ 
adequate domicle. 5) They duty to furnish social and 
religious guidance ••• " ~1 
As indicated, then, the support_duty of a parent extends ~ 
past the obligation to provide only money. In the case of ~~-~ii~ 
McAhren's Adoptio~J 331 A2d, 419 (M.D. 1975), the court said, ~ 
"Parenting is more than a passive state of financial obligation, ;~ 
rather it is an active, occupation calling for constant, affirma- 1~1 
tive demonstrations of parental love, protection, and concern." :d1 
Several other states have realized that services, as 
well as money, can be an element of a child •-s support. See rill1 
McGowen v. State, 566 Southwest 2d.1958; Holmes v. Criminal ·111, 
Injuries Compensation Board, 359 A2d. 90, 278 M.D. 60, Day~· 
Brooks, 224 N.E. 2d. 561 10 Ohio Misc. 273. As can be seen in j.:: 
society, today, what is termed "Child Support" in the law, most ~t 
often consists of what would better be termed "Child Contribution. 1~11 
Seldom does the money contributed by the non-custodial parent 
totally support a child. 
As a general rule, the burdens of support fall heavier 
on the custodial parent than the non-custodial parent. It is ~I 
the custodial parent who provides a home, prepares the meals, i~t1 
and clothes the child, often using his or her own income to ~I 
supplement whatever child support is being received. The earning ~11 
potential of a custodial parent may be impaired by the necessity ~~ 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of always being on call as a parent. The finances of a 
custodial parent, particularly one with other children, or 
with little training, may be so strained as to make it impossible 
for the parent to hire a caretaker for the child while he or she 
works. A custodial parent bears the responsibility for the day 
to day care, training, discipline and medical care of the 
child. The judge has discression to take these responsibilities 
into consideration when deciding who should be required to 
seek gainful employment to support. the child,. The court may 
require either pare~t to reiieve the other where there has been 
a hearing and it is found that the 'circumstances warrant 
relief. Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518 (Utah, 1978). 
In this particular case we have a child born out of 
wedlock. Here the mother has born full responsibility for the 
care, training, discipline, ~nd physical needs for the child 
since her birth. The child's father did not contribute anything 
to the child's maintenance, nor was he able to contribute any-
thing to the child except in the form of financial support. 
An appropriate hearing was held in which it was found that 
both the child and mother were in such necessitous circumstances 
as to require support by the State from the time of the child's 
birth until her death. The Court took into consideration 
the financial situation of the father and found him liable to the 
State of Utah, Department of,:Social Services, in the sum of $4,179.67. 
This amount represented the sums expended by the State for the 
child's birth and maintenance until her death. The Court took notice 
of the fact that the father was in prison, and temporarily unable 
to satisfy the judgment, and stayed the judgment until he was 
out -~ -- · :::·.:,c:__;o\lo~L....lV)l~oucjri( Jcelease program. 
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It was within the court's discretion to order the 
father to reimburse the State for money it had expended in the 
past for the support of the child. (See State Department of 
Social Services v. Clark, Supra). It is also within the court's i 
discretion to stay an order of child support until such time 
as the father can pay it. Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d. 231 
(Utah 1971). ~ 
The Appellant's Brief makes several assumptions about i~ 
the situation of the plaintiff-mother which are not warranted by 
the record. Appellant claims that the mother had shirked her P.) 
responsibility as a parent. However, the record is devoid of any~ 
evidence to support this conclusion. The Appellant also assumes H 
that the mother was more capable of obtaining employment than the~ 
father, but there is no evidence to support this conclusion in 
the record. We do not know how many other children the mother ha(:t:: 
to care for or their ages. We do not know her age or how heal thy ~i 
she was. We do not know whether she had any marketable skills ~i 
which would enable her to earn enough money to support herself an( 
her family and pay for substitute care for the child(ren). The 
burdens of finding employment for a young woman with several 
children, poor health, and little or no training could render hM 
no more capable of earning a living than a prisoner. The court 
~ti 
had the opportunity to observe the circumstances of the plaintiff · 
~. 
and to weigh the relative burdens of support on the parties. 
f ~ It was within the court•s discretion to relieve either parent 0 
~ 
the financial obligations of support if it felt the circumstances 
and the welfare of the child warranted it. Forbush supra. ~ 
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of the child, Geneva Otero, of responsibilities to help 
care for the child. Appellant equates a court ordered amount of 
money as the only criteria of what constitutes "support." 
Respondent believesthat from the discussion here presented, it is 
obvious that there is more than a direct court ordered contribution. 
For Appellant to say that Geneva Otero contributed nothing, and 
that he is being "stuck with the entire amount" is a naive 
approach and misunderstanding of the entire circumstances. 
The equal protection argument suggested by Appellant 
was not raised at the time of hearing and so the Appellant is 
precluded from raising it on appeal. Even if it could be consider-
ed here, it would have to be considered without merit as per the 
analysis, heretofore made. 
The Court heard the matter below and the judgments 
rendered are within the court's prerogative, there is no 
evidence of abuse in such a ruling. They should not be disturbed 
upon appeal. 
POINT V 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS JUST AND 
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD 
NOT BE OVERTURNED. 
Appellant's brief positsa hypothetical situation in 
which the Appellant feels a result contrary to his position in 
the instant case would provide a poor precedent according to 
Appellant, an affirmance of the trial court's ruling would be 
precedent for requiring a disabled mother to reimburse the State 
many years after the fact for money expended in the support of 
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her indigent child. The Appellants hypothetical is not the 
case before the court, but even if it were, the instant case 
would not mandate such a result. 
First of all, the defendant in this case is not disabl~. 
He is incarcerated at the State prison because of a conviction 
for robbery. (See record) His inability to earn a living is 
only temporary and will cease when he is released from prison. 
His inability to earn a living is not something beyond his conh~ 
such as illness or handicap, but is the result of his own wrong 
doing, the commission of a felony. A father (or mother) cannot 
be relieved of the support of a child because of his or her own 
~( 
wrong doing. Clark supra and In Re Adoption of Dobb& 531 P.2d 
303 (Wash. App. 1975). 
iii Secondly, this is an action for arrearages for support 
already paid, not an action to determine support. Under the 
'ill! 
holding of the Clark case, the father is obligated to reimburse th·::· 
State for actual amounts of support which the State has already 
expended for his child. 
Thirdly, a hearing was held and the financial condition 
of the father was reviewed. It was determined that he owed 
~I 
$4, 17 9. 67 in past support and medical expenses. It was also deter~~ 
f ~I mined that he was unable to pay this amount at present because o 
his inability to earn a living and execution was stayed until 
such time as the defendant-appellant is capable of earning a 
livinq again. At the hearing, it was determined that: 
1. The father was in prison and temporarily unable to 
earn a living. 
2. The child was a minor tA!h.~ -~7~ c, t:n T'l~O~ ~ ..... A nn;:ahle to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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earn a living. 
3. The father had no other support obligation. 
(See Record) 
These findings meet the requirements of U.C.A. 
Section 78-45-7 (1953 as amended) i~ that they take into 
account, 
"the standard of living and situation of the 
parties, the relative income and wealth of the 
parties, the ability of the obliger to earn, 
the ability of the obligee to earn, the need 
of the obligee, the age of the parties, and the 
responsibility of the obliger for the support of 
others". 
A reversdl of the trial court would provide a much more 
dangerous precedent than the hypothetical the Appellant raises. 
If the court rules that Appellant is not liable for support, 
it will set a precedent which would release all prisoners 
from their obligations to support theirdependents. Under this 
type of ruling, the habitual criminal or escaped felon could 
get a woman pregnant while he was out of prison and pass the 
entire obligation of the support and care of the child off to 
the woman and/or the State without ever carrying any of the 
responsibilities for the child, so long as the father remained 
in prison. If the father was an itinerant hobo, he would 
not be relieved of his obligation to support because of his 
indigency. No parent should be relieved of his obligation of 
support because his own fault has rendered him temporarily 
impecunious. See: In Re Adoption of Dobb~ 531 P.2d 303 (Wash. 
App. 1975). It is the policy of this State that a parent not be 
relieved of his obligation to support because of his misdeeds• 
Clark, supra. Upholding the decision of the trial court furthers 
~11-
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this policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have obtained a judgment requiring the 
defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for $4,179.67 paid by 
the State for the support of his impa:unious child. This judgment 11 
should be upheld. That a parent is not relieved of his obliga-
tion to support his off spring because of his imprisonment, 
is the policy of this state and should continue to be so. The 
Court should therefore sustain the judgment of the court that 
the State of Utah is entitled to reimbursement for money actually 
expended by the State for support of a prisoner's dependent child 
while he or she is incarcerated. This judgment is mandated by 
the following considerations: 
1. The duty to support one's child attaches as soon as 
the child is born. Parents cannot contract away that obligation 
or ~oid the obligation by their misdeeds. 
2. When the State must step in to rescue an impoverished 
child, the State is entitled to reimbursement from the child's 
parent~ and in this case the father where he is living and capahle 
of earning a living or contributing to the care. 
3. If, at a hearing the father is found to be unable 
to provide support because of a temporary incapacity, the court 
has the authority to stay execution of a support obligation until 
he regains his ability to earn a living. 
4. In an action for reimbursement of monies paid by 
the State for support, the State is entitled to the full amount 
expended for the child's support. Sponsore  by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitizati n provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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5. It is within the court's discretion, after looking 
at the evidence, to order one parent and to relieve the other 
parent of the burden of support, particularly where the parent 
charged with support payments is the non-custodial parent. 
6. The Court did not abuse its disgression requiring 
a defendant to pay past support, and in the absence of the abuse 
of discretion1the ruling should be allowed to stand. 
Therefore, pursuant to these considerations, and the 
analysis of the positions here presented, the judgment of 
the trial court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
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